

MEAN-DEVIATION ANALYSIS IN THE THEORY OF CHOICE

Bogdan Grechuk

Anton Molyboha

Michael Zabaranin

Department of Mathematical Sciences

Stevens Institute of Technology

Outline

- **Motivation: Preference Axioms for Mean-Deviation Analysis**
- **Preferences: Basic Axioms and Numerical Representation**
- **Expected Utility and Dual Utility**
- **Coherent Risk Measures: Axiomatic Derivation**
- **Paradoxes and Dual Paradoxes**
- **Mean-Deviation Analysis: Axiomatic Derivation**
- **Concluding Remarks**

Decision Making Under Uncertainty

- **Expected Utility Theory**

von Neumann, Morgenstern (1944)

- **Dual Utility Theory**

Yaari (1987)

- **Coherent Risk Measures**

Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, Heath (1999)

- **Mean-Variance Analysis**

Markowitz (1952)

$$V(EX, \sigma(X)) \quad V \uparrow \text{ in } EX, \quad V \downarrow \text{ in } \sigma(X)$$

- **Mean-Deviation Analysis**

Rockafellar, Uryasev, Zabarankin (2002)

$$V(EX, \mathcal{D}(X))$$

Basic Axioms of Rational Behaviour

Theory of choice: Preference relation \succeq

A1 Neutrality

$$F_X = F_Y \Rightarrow X \sim Y$$

A2 Complete weak order

\succeq is reflexive, transitive and connected

A3 Strict monotonicity

$X \geq Y \Rightarrow X \succeq Y$. Moreover, for constants $C_1 > C_2 \Rightarrow C_1 \succ C_2$.

A4 \mathcal{L}^p -continuity

$$X_n \rightarrow X, Y_n \rightarrow Y, \forall n X_n \succeq Y_n \Rightarrow X \succeq Y$$

A5 Finiteness

$\forall X \exists C_1, C_2$ such that $C_1 \succeq X \succeq C_2$.

Numerical representation

Theorem.

Let \succeq satisfies axioms *A1 – A5*.

Then $\exists! U : \mathcal{L}^p(\Omega) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, such that


- $X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow U(X) \geq U(Y)$.
- For every constant r. v. C we have $U(C) = C$

Moreover, $\forall X$ we have $X \sim U(X)$.

$U(X)$ is called **certainty equivalent**.

Second-Order Stochastic Dominance (SSD)

$$X \succ_{SSD} Y \iff \forall t \int_{-\infty}^t F_X(x) dx \leq \int_{-\infty}^t F_Y(y) dy$$



A6 Risk-averseness $X \succ_{SSD} Y, EX = EY \Rightarrow X \succeq Y$

Expected utility theory

Lottery: $X \rightarrow F_X, Y \rightarrow F_Y, Z \rightarrow F_Z = \lambda F_X + (1 - \lambda)F_Y \Rightarrow$
 Z is called **λ -lottery** of X and Y .

Notation: $Z = \lambda X \oplus (1 - \lambda)Y$

A7 Independence axiom

$$X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow \lambda X \oplus (1 - \lambda)Z \succeq \lambda Y \oplus (1 - \lambda)Z$$

Theorem.


Let \succeq satisfies axioms **A1 – A5** and **A7**.

Then $U(X) = Eu(X)$ for some non-decreasing $u : R \rightarrow R$

$$X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow Eu(X) \geq Eu(Y)$$

\succeq satisfies also **A6** $\Leftrightarrow u(\cdot)$ is concave.

Theories Interconnection



Dual utility theory

Idea: Lottery \rightarrow Mixture of comonotonic random variables.

X and Y are **comonotonic** \Leftrightarrow

$$(X(\omega_1) - X(\omega_2))(Y(\omega_1) - Y(\omega_2)) \geq 0 \quad \forall \omega_1, \omega_2 \in \Omega$$

A8. Dual independence axiom

Let X, Y, Z be comonotonic. Then


$$X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow \lambda X + (1 - \lambda)Z \succeq \lambda Y + (1 - \lambda)Z$$

Theorem. Let \succeq satisfies axioms **A1 – A5** and **A8**.

Then $U(X) = \int_0^1 f(1 - F_X(t))dt$ for some $f : R \rightarrow R$

\succeq satisfies also **A6** $\Leftrightarrow f(\cdot)$ is convex.

Theories Interconnection



Coherent Risk Measures

Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath

(R1) constant translation

$$\mathcal{R}(X + C) = \mathcal{R}(X) - C \text{ for all } X \text{ and constants } C$$

(R2) positive homogeneity

$$\mathcal{R}(0) = 0, \text{ and } \mathcal{R}(\lambda X) = \lambda \mathcal{R}(X) \text{ for all } X \text{ and all } \lambda > 0$$

(R3) subadditivity

$$\mathcal{R}(X + Y) \leq \mathcal{R}(X) + \mathcal{R}(Y) \text{ for all } X \text{ and } Y$$

(R4) monotonicity

$$\mathcal{R}(X) \leq \mathcal{R}(Y) \text{ when } X \geq Y \text{ (almost surely)}$$

Expectation-Bounded Risk Measures

(R5) strict expectation-boundedness

$$\mathcal{R}(X) > E[-X] \text{ for } X \not\equiv C$$

R1, R2, R3, R5 — strictly expectation bounded risk measures

Comonotonic risk measures

Risk measure $\mathcal{R}(X)$ is **comonotonic** if

$$\forall \text{ comonotonic } X \text{ and } Y \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}(X + Y) = \mathcal{R}(X) + \mathcal{R}(Y)$$

Theorem.

Let \succeq satisfies axioms **A1 – A6** and **A8**.


Then $U(X) = -\mathcal{R}(X)$,

$\mathcal{R}(X)$ is coherent risk measure which is

- continuous
- law-invariant
- **comonotonic**

$$X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{R}(X) \leq \mathcal{R}(Y)$$

Theories Interconnection



Dual Independence Axiom Relaxation

Dual independence axiom \Rightarrow

\Rightarrow Convexity

\Rightarrow Constant absolute risk aversion

\Rightarrow Constant relative risk aversion

A9 Convexity

X and Y comonotonic, $X \sim Y \Rightarrow \lambda X + (1 - \lambda)Y \succeq Y$

A10 Constant absolute risk aversion

$X \succeq Y, C \text{ constant} \Rightarrow X + C \succeq Y + C$

A11 Constant relative risk aversion

$X \succeq Y, \lambda > 0 \Rightarrow \lambda X \succeq \lambda Y$

Coherent risk measures

Theorem.

Let \succeq satisfies axioms $A1 - A6$ and $A9 - A11$.

Then $U(X) = -\mathcal{R}(X)$,


$\mathcal{R}(X)$ is coherent risk measure which is continuous and law-invariant

$$X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{R}(X) \leq \mathcal{R}(Y)$$

$A8 \rightarrow A9, A10, A11$

comonotonic coherent risk measure \rightarrow coherent risk measure.

Theories Interconnection



Paradoxes and dual paradoxes

Utility theory:

Possible: $X \prec 0, Y \prec 0$ but $1/2X + 1/2Y \succ 0$

Impossible: $X \succ 0, Y \succ 0$ but $1/2X + 1/2Y \prec 0$

Dual utility theory \Leftrightarrow Coherent comonotonic risk measures

Possible: $X \succ 0, Y \succ 0$ but $1/2X \oplus 1/2Y \prec 0$

Impossible: $X \prec 0, Y \prec 0$ but $1/2X \oplus 1/2Y \succ 0$

Coherent risk measures

Possible: $X \succ 0, Y \succ 0$ but $1/2X \oplus 1/2Y \prec 0$

Possible: $X \prec 0, Y \prec 0$ but $1/2X \oplus 1/2Y \succ 0$

Bi-criteria Optimization

- **Mean-Variance approach (Markowitz)**
Reward: EX
Risk: $\sigma(X)$
- **Mean-Risk models (Ruszczynski, Ogryczak)**
Reward: EX
Risk: $\sigma_-(X), \sigma_+(X), MAD(X), \dots$
- **Mean-Deviation analysis (Rockafellar et.al.)**
Reward: EX
Risk: $\mathcal{D}(X)$

General Deviation Measures

- **(D1) – insensitivity to constant shift**

$$\mathcal{D}(X + C) = \mathcal{D}(X) \text{ for all } X \text{ and constants } C$$

- **(D2) – positive homogeneity**

$$\mathcal{D}(\lambda X) = \lambda \mathcal{D}(X) \text{ for all } X \text{ and all } \lambda > 0$$

- **(D3) – subadditivity**

$$\mathcal{D}(X + X') \leq \mathcal{D}(X) + \mathcal{D}(Y) \text{ for all } X \text{ and } Y$$

- **(D4) – nonnegativity**

$$\mathcal{D}(X) \geq 0 \text{ (equality for constant } X)$$

- **(D5) – lower range dominated**

$$\mathcal{D}(X) \leq EX - \inf X \text{ for all } X$$

Examples of Deviation Measures

- **Standard Deviation**

$$\sigma(X) = (E[X - EX]^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

- **Standard Semideviations**

$$\sigma_+(X) = (E[\max\{X - EX, 0\}^2])^{1/2}$$

$$\sigma_-(X) = (E[\max\{EX - X, 0\}^2])^{1/2}$$

- **Deviation measure from range**

$$EX - \inf X$$


- **Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) deviation**

$$\text{for } \alpha \in [0, 1] \quad \text{CVaR}_\alpha^\Delta(X) = EX - \frac{1}{\alpha} \int_0^\alpha (-\text{VaR}_p(X)) dp$$

Mean-Deviation Analysis

Mean-Deviation Analysis

$$V(EX, \mathcal{D}(X))$$



$$\mathcal{D}(X) = \sigma(X)$$

Mean-Variance Analysis

$$V(EX, \sigma(X))$$

$$V(m, d) = -m + d$$

Risk Measures

$$\mathcal{R}(X) = -EX + \mathcal{D}(X)$$

\mathcal{D} is lower range dominated

$\Rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is coherent risk measure

Mean-Deviation Analysis

Aim:

Axioms $A1 - A5$ + new axioms $\Rightarrow U(X) = V(EX, \mathcal{D}(X))$

$X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow V(EX, \mathcal{D}(X)) \geq V(EY, \mathcal{D}(Y))$

Questions

- What conditions on $\mathcal{D}(X)$?
- What conditions on $V(m, d)$?
- What new axioms?

Axioms analysis

A11 Constant relative risk aversion

$$X \succeq Y, \lambda > 0 \Rightarrow \lambda X \succeq \lambda Y$$

$$(0 \text{ or } 100) \succ (40 \text{ for sure})$$

\Downarrow ?

$$(0 \text{ or } 10,000) \succ (4,000 \text{ for sure})$$

A10 Constant absolute risk aversion

$$X \succeq Y, C \text{ constant} \Rightarrow X + C \succeq Y + C$$

$$Y \text{ with } EY = 10 \sim 1 \text{ for sure}$$

\Downarrow ?

$$Y + 1 \sim 2 \text{ for sure}$$

Axioms relaxation

Idea: Axioms for coherent risk measures + condition $(EX=EY)$ = new set of axioms (relaxed).

A12 Convexity with $EX = EY$

X and Y comonotonic, $X \sim Y$ and $EX = EY \Rightarrow$
 $\lambda X + (1 - \lambda)Y \succeq Y$

A13 Constant absolute risk aversion with $EX = EY$

$X \succeq Y$ and $EX = EY$, C constant $\Rightarrow X + C \succeq Y + C$

A14 Constant relative risk aversion with $EX = EY$

$X \succeq Y$ and $EX = EY$, $\lambda > 0 \Rightarrow \lambda X \succeq \lambda Y$

- A9 + $(EX=EY) \rightarrow$ A12
- A10 + $(EX=EY) \rightarrow$ A13
- A11 + $(EX=EY) \rightarrow$ A14

Conditions on Deviation Measure

Let $\mathcal{D}(X)$ be

- Continuous (natural)
- Law-invariant (natural)
- **Weakly lower-range dominated** (additional)

Definition: $\mathcal{D}(X)$ is weakly lower-range dominated \Leftrightarrow

$$\sup_{X \neq C} \frac{\mathcal{D}(X)}{EX - \inf X} = K < \infty \quad (1)$$

$K \leq 1 \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{D}(X)$ is lower-range dominated

Conditions on $V(m,d)$

$$X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow V(EX, \mathcal{D}(X)) \geq V(EY, \mathcal{D}(Y))$$

Let $V(m, d)$ be continuous and satisfies

V1 Strictly increasing in m (natural)

V2 Strictly decreasing in d (natural)

V3 Normalization: $V(m, 0) = m$ (technical)

V4 $\exists K > 0$: such that $\forall m, d \geq 0, a \geq 0$ we have

$$V(m, d) \leq V(m + a, d + aK). \text{ (additional)}$$

Main result

Theorem. The following are equivalent.

• \succeq satisfies axioms $A1 - A6$ and $A12 - A14$.

• $\exists K > 0, \mathcal{D}(X)$ and $V(m, d)$ such that


$$X \succeq Y \Leftrightarrow V(EX, \mathcal{D}(X)) \geq V(EY, \mathcal{D}(Y))$$

where $\mathcal{D}(X)$ is a deviation measure which is

- continuous
- law-invariant
- weakly lower-range dominated with constant K

and $V(m, d)$ satisfies $V1 - V3$ and $V4$ with constant K

Theories Interconnection



Concluding Remarks

- **Axioms A1-A5 \Rightarrow Numerical representation of preferences**
 $U(X)$
- **Axioms A1-A5 + A7 \Rightarrow Expected Utility Theory**
 $U(X) = Eu(X)$
- **Axioms A1-A5 + A8 \Rightarrow Dual Utility Theory**
- **Axioms A1-A6 + A8 \Rightarrow Coherent Comonotonic Risk Measures**
 $U(X) = -\mathcal{R}(X)$
- **Axioms A1-A6 + A9-A11 \Rightarrow Coherent Risk Measures**
 $U(X) = -\mathcal{R}(X)$
- **Axioms A1-A6 + A12-A14 \Rightarrow Mean-Deviation Analysis**
 $U(X) = V(EX, \mathcal{D}(X))$